Indeed, one can hardly deny the need for a radically new approach to the issue of arbitrability under the New York Convention. W e believe, however, that the source of inconsistency is not the Convention itself, but, rather, confusing interpretations of its different provisions, coupled with an inappropriate method of analysis. First, distinct notions such as non-arbitrability per se, the validity of the arbitration clause, and the public policy exception, are often intermingled, thereby causing confusion. Secondly, regarding method, non-arbitrability has been systematically treated as a problem of conflict of law rather than conflict of jurisdiction. Together, they have led national courts to examine the issue of arbitrability by reference to foreign law rather than the law of the forum. W e believe any such reference to foreign standards of arbitrability to be quite unwarranted in the context of current international arbitration law and practice.
As explicitly stated in Article V(2) (a) of the Convention, the enforcement of an award may be refused only if 'the subject matter of the differences is not capable of settlement by arbitration under the law of that country, i.e. the lex fori of the enforcement court. There is nothing to prevent a similar solution from also applying under Article II of the Convention, when recognition of the arbitration clause and referral to arbitration is sought by one of the parties to the dispute. The exclusive application of the lex fori would indeed offer a simple, clear and uniform approach to the issue of arbitrability under the Convention. Surprisingly enough, it also appears to be the only solution consistent with the widespread liberal policy in favor arbitrandum adopted by national legal systems. 6 'Subparagraph V(2)(a) shall not prevent recognition and enforcement unless the non-arbitrability of the subject matter is a matter of such fundamental importance that recognition and enforcement would also violate subparagraph V(2)(b)' (Paulsson, supra n. 2, at p. 104). 'Does the World Need Additional Uniform Legislation on Arbitration? The 1998 Freshfiekls Lecture ' (1999) 15 Arbitration International 211 at p. 219 er seq. The solution advocated in this article (exclusive application of the lex fori) has been advanced before (see in particular Albert J. van den Berg, The New York Arbitration Convention of 1958 (Kluwer 1981 , at p. 1.52 et seq. and references in notes 96 and 98), prompting sharp criticism from renowned scholars and practitioners (in particular Bernard Hanotiau, 'L'arbitrabilite et la favor arbitrandum: un reexamen ' (1994) J. D. Int. 899 at p. 923 et seq.; Paulsson, supra n. 2). However, as we shall attempt to demonstrate in section II below, this solution certainly deserves renewed consideration, and may even be re<'onstrued in the light of recent treatment of arbitrability in international disputes in court decisions and national legislation.
II. T H E ISSUE OF ARBITRABILITY BEFORE T H E ARBITRAL TRIBUNAL (a) Arbitrability Governed by a Substantive Rule of the Forum
The law governing the various issues that may arise in international arbitration is usually determined through the application of rules and principles of conflict of laws, which manage potential conflicts between competing domestic legal systems. Certain issues, however, are governed by substantive rules of the forum. 7 The reason behind the choice of substantive rather than conflict rules is the widespread belief that international arbitration represents an institution of global rather than national interest, such that certain of its aspects are more appropriately governed by a body of rules and principles specifically tailored to its international character. 8 This applies in particular to arbitrability, which is increasingly held to be governed by substantive rules of the forum. The best illustrations are Article 177 of the Swiss PIL Statute, Article 1030 of the German ZPO, and possibly the UNCITRAL Model Law. 9 According to the Swiss PIL Statute, for example, all disputes involving property rights ('de nature patrimoniale') are capable of settlement by arbitration.
Under such legislation, the arbitral tribunal is bound to apply the forum's standards on international arbitrability and, normally, need not take account of more stringent foreign standards when ruling on its own jurisdiction. As stated by the Swiss Federal Supreme Court, it is for the claimant to bear the risk of nonenforceability of the award abroad, where the subject matter of the dispute is incapable of settlement by arbitration under the laws of other countries.
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There are, of course, limits to arbitrability. Almost all legal systems provide for exceptions -'non-arbitrable' areas -even in relation to disputes involving property rights.
11 So the question remains as to how one should determine such exceptions to arbitrability, and according to which law.
Comparative case law and legal commentaries seem to suggest that the answer is to be found in the rules of international public policy, i.e. the set of mandatory Jean Robert, 'De la regie de conflit a la regie materielle en matiere d'arbitrage', in J. C. Schultz and A. J. van den Berg, eds., The Art of Arbitration (1982) 273; see also Marc Blessing, 'Globalization (and Harmonization) of Arbitration ' (1992) ['arbitrage commercial international (Paris, 1996) rules which are in all circumstances applicable to the merits of an international dispute. This suggestion is open to question. One may wonder if it takes adequate account of national courts' growing leniency towards the arbitrability of areas strongly marked by social and economic policies. Case law provides abundant evidence that large portions of regulatory and public policy-oriented activities are today capable of setdement by arbitration, at least where international transactions are concerned.
12 In short, the so-called imperatif de police is no longer an impediment to international arbitration.
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Given that international arbitrators are generally empowered to apply international public policy rules, does it still make any sense to derive the limits on arbitrability from local, foreign or transnational rules of international public policy?
(b) 'Non-arbitrability' Governed by Conflict of Jurisdiction Rules
Traditionally, 'non-arbitrability' results from public policy rules determined to be applicable to the underlying dispute pursuant to relevant conflict of laws principles.
14 In our opinion, this approach is outdated. As clearly indicated by recent case law, restrictions upon arbitrability usually stem, not from public policy rules, but from the compulsory jurisdiction of national courts prompted by public policy. As stated by the Swiss Federal Supreme Court in an obiter dictum in the Fincantieri decision,' [arbitrability could
To mention a few key decisions: the famous Mitsubishi decision by the US Supreme Court, 437 US 614 ((1986) 16 and is also to be found in the US Supreme Court Mitsubishi decision. 17 The necessary prerequisite for determining 'non-arbitrability' is therefore the existence of a rule that establishes the mandatory jurisdiction of a State court to the exclusion of arbitration. 18 Thus, to identify possible restrictions upon arbitrability, attention needs to be redirected and focused first on the jurisdiction of the courts.
In international disputes, the jurisdiction of a local court, and the set of conditions for recognizing the jurisdiction of foreign courts, are defined by rules and principles dealing with conflicts of jurisdiction. The jurisdiction of a State court is said to be 'international' when it bears upon a cross-border dispute, which is typically the case when the parties are located in two or more countries.
In commercial matters, the international jurisdiction of State courts can be divided into three basic categories. The first covers the courts' 'ordinary' jurisdiction over private disputes. This category is governed by principles such as personal jurisdiction (actum sequitur forum rei) and subject-matter jurisdiction (loci delicti or loci executionis). Parties can usually derogate from the ordinary competence of the courts through a forum selection clause. The second category comprises the 'quasi-mandatory' competence of the courts, which affords special protection to a weaker party and limits the parties' free choice of a forum for judicial action. 19 The third category, of particular interest here, consists of the ATF 118 II 353, supra, n. 10, at 3c, also stating that: 'Public policy would only be relevant if it imperatively required that the disputed claims be submitted to a state authority... .' It is important to mention that this obiter dictum was arrived at during a soul-searching analysis of Article 177 of the Swiss PIL Statute. In fact, the Federal Supreme Court had first emphasized that me liberal solution adopted by Article 177 of me PIL Statute 'makes no reservation in favour of the exclusive jurisdiction of state courts, in contrast to the Article 5 Concordat Intercantonal'. Nevertheless, the Court finally comes to the conclusion that if there should be any public policy restriction to Article 177 of the PIL Statute, such restriction must necessarily be derived from the exclusive jurisdiction of a State court. 16 Decision dated 16 Febuary 1989 16 Febuary , in (1989 Rev. de I'Arb. 711: 'L'inarbitrabilite d'un litige au regard de l'ordre public ne doit pas s'entendre de l'interdiction faite aux arbitres d'appliquer des dispositions imperatives, mais seulement de statuer dans une matiere relevant par sa nature de la competence exclusive de la juridiction etatique... .' 17 In Mitsubishi (supra n. 12, at p. 559, no. 6), the US Supreme Court considered that if 'Congress intended the substantive protection afforded by a given statute to include protection against waiver of the right to a judicial forum, mat intention will be deductible from the legislative history'; and also infra n. 34. See the rather confusing debate in Germany: Simms, supra n. 11 at p. 193 et seq. 'mandatory' competence of a given court or public authority, from which no contractual or foreign statutory derogation is permitted or recognized. 20 The 'international' jurisdiction of territorial courts is mandatory because the principal claim in dispute (i) involves the creation/annulment of property rights subject to public registration and designed to produce an erga omnes effect (such as real estate and intellectual property), (ii) is of interest to the public at large (such as bankruptcy proceedings and aspects of employment policy), or (iii) involves regulatory and sovereign intervention by an administrative authority (for example, antitrust exemption under Article 85(3) of the EC Rome Treaty (Article 81(3) European Union Convention), or fiscal, social security or other economic policies).
In our opinion, there is no reason to restrict arbitrability other than for issues falling within this third category -the exercise of mandatory and exclusive jurisdiction by a State court or authority over the principal claim in dispute. There is no valid reason to adopt a more cautious attitude towards international arbitrators than to foreign judges with respect to the recognition of their jurisdiction.
Arbitration is no longer perceived as a tolerated encroachment upon the State's monopoly over justice, but as the ordinary means of resolving international commercial disputes. For parties to an international transaction, arbitration usually affords legal protection and security equal to, if not greater than, that offered by State courts. Furthermore, arbitrators are bound to respect the public-policy rules of any given country where relevant and applicable. 21 Compliance with this duty is guaranteed through court scrutiny of the final award under the public policy exception, both at the stage of enforcement (Article V(2)(b)) and, in our opinion, in applications for the award to be set aside made to courts at the place of arbitration.
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True, a weaker party, as in consumer contracts, may find it excessively burdensome to pursue its claims or defence before arbitrators in unfamiliar and complex cross-border proceedings. But in the absence of a statute prescribing mandatory protection by State courts, there is no reason to rule out as a matter of cont.
Tribunal principle the arbitrability of disputes arising in connection with consumer contracts. Rather, when in a given case submission of the dispute to arbitration is determined to be excessively harmful to one party, judges may always consider the arbitration agreement as ineffective or inoperative under the ordinary principles of contract law, such as duress and unconscionable conduct.
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Exceptions to arbitrability may thus be derived from a rule in force at the seat of arbitration providing for the exclusive and mandatory jurisdiction of a local or foreign authority. However, since such rules can be applied to arbitration only by analogy, a second step consists of examining the ratio legis of the rule, in order to ascertain whether its scope of application is limited to court proceedings or, on the contrary, would also justify the preclusion of international arbitration.
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To sum up, when an arbitral tribunal disregard the forum's standards on arbitrability as defined above, its award runs the risk of being challenged and set aside by courts at the seat of arbitration. Conversely, the arbitral tribunal is under no obligation to respect foreign legislation giving a foreign court exclusive jurisdiction over the dispute. It is at this point that a delicate question would arise: can reciprocity be applied and, in turn, the foreign court claiming exclusive jurisdiction be allowed to ignore the arbitrators' jurisdiction? The New York Convention deals with this problem.
III. A R T I C L E 11(1) N E W Y O R K C O N V E N T I O N : A R B I T R A B I L I T Y U N D E R T H E LEX FORI
Before examining Article 11(1), a clear distinction needs to be drawn between arbitrability per se and the validity of the arbitration clause. 
(a) Validity of the Arbitration Clause and Arbitrability Distinguished
The arbitration clause is essentially a matter of private agreement. To be valid it requires valid consent by the parties. Such consent is governed by the ordinary principles of contract law, which govern the parties' expression of consent, its form, scope and reach. Arbitrability, however, when properly understood, is connected with the statutory jurisdiction of courts, the public administration of justice and the organization of the judiciary. This explains the clear distinction that arbitration laws draw between arbitrability, on the one hand, and the validity of the arbitration clause, on the other.
While arbitrability is invariably subject to the standards of the lex fori, the law governing the validity of the arbitration clause is usually subject to conflict rules (e.g. Art. 178 Swiss PIL Statute, Arts. 8(1) and 34(2)(a)(i) UNCITRAL Model Law). Indeed, national courts may resort to the conflict rules of Article V(l)(a) of the Convention for the purpose of determining the validity of the arbitration agreement under Article II(3), 26 but no such reference to conflict of laws seems to be necessary for the purposes of determining arbitrability under Article 11(1).
(b) Arbitrability Governed by die Lex Fori
Nothing in Article II of the Convention indicates that arbitrability per se, unlike the causes of the nullity of the arbitration agreement, is subject to any law other than the lex fori.
According to Article 11(1), a court should recognize the parties' agreement to refer to arbitration any differences relating to 'a subject matter capable of settlement by arbitration'. Article 11(2) lays down the formal requirements of an arbitration clause. Article 11(3) then comes into play, in order to deal with mandatory referral to arbitration. Therefore, and as a matter of practical concern, the only situation directly regulated by Article II is when a local court is seized of cont. commercial international (1994) ((1985) 10 Y B Comm. Arb. 374) shows how an overlap may occur between arbitrability and die nullity of the arbitration clause for reasons of 'public policy'. By way of illustration, one may mention a case where the illegality of the contract would be so fundamental (a contract between drug traffickers) that it would exclude arbitration of any dispute under mat contract, as illustrated by die London Court of Appeal's decision in Westacre v. Jugoimport (cf. supra n. 12). In such hypothesis, however, die arbitration clause is clearly void for reasons of illegality and public policy (Article 11(3)), rather man nonarbitrability (Article 11(1)). See also discussion of Article 11(3), infra section IV.
an action on the merits of the dispute, and has to decide on whether it should decline jurisdiction in favour of arbitration. In other words, Article II of the Convention, when properly construed, leaves no room for a declaratory action on the nullity of the arbitration clause. 27 The Convention can at best be interpreted as permitting a declaratory action in municipal courts when provided by municipal law, but it certainly does not govern any such actions or similar types of relief.
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It must therefore be assumed mat, in the absence of an arbitration agreement, a court acting under Article II of the Convention would also be the competent authority to hear the case on the merits. As such, the arbitration clause merely constitutes an exception to the local court's inherent or statutory jurisdiction, and it is only incidentally that the local court is required to rule on the validity of the clause on the one hand and the arbitrability of the subject matter on the other.
29
Whether a plea for the arbitration clause to be declared null and void must be upheld or dismissed may of course depend on the law applicable to that clause. 30 However, the exclusive jurisdiction of the local court itself is another issue, which is inevitably governed by the laws of the forum itself. If the lex fori reserves the dispute to the international jurisdiction of the State court and excludes arbitration, that court is necessarily bound to assert jurisdiction, notwithstanding an otherwise valid arbitration clause. For example, the accelerated and facilitated judicial declaration that a party is not subject to an arbitration agreement as provided by the new German arbitration law, Article 1032(2) ZPO, or a motion to compel a party to arbitrate in common law systems. Cf. Poudret, supra n. 27; Hascher, supra n. 27, at pp. 57-58. 30 In this regard, Jan Paulsson's proposition with regard to the law applicable to the validity of the arbitration clause is perfecdy correct: see supra n. 3. 31 See the Italian Corte di Cassazione COGECO decision of 27 April 1979 27 April ((1981 German law vests with exclusive jurisdiction over any dispute relating to the validity of a German patent. The German company objects to the jurisdiction of the German Patentgericht by relying on Article II of the New York Convention, and proving that the dispute is arbitrable under Swiss law. If die German court upholds the arbitration plea and refers the parties to arbitration in Geneva, it may be feared mat the US company, even if successful in the arbitral proceedings, will neither be able to collect damages in Germany nor obtain revocation of the patent by the German patent office, as an arbitration award on this issue would be unenforceable in Germany. 32 The German Patentgericht is therefore bound to apply the lex fori, dismiss the arbitration plea and assert jurisdiction.
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By contrast, to allow foreign legislation to govern the jurisdiction of local courts, limit such jurisdiction, or interfere with the forum's rules on the mandatory jurisdiction of its courts is hardly conceivable. Nor may foreign legislation, or even the law of autonomy (lex electionis or lex contractus) chosen by the parties, alter, restrict or broaden the mandatory jurisdiction of local courts and thus the forum's standards of international arbitrability.
34 It would not be presumptuous, therefore, for us to construe all decisions where a court has declined jurisdiction and referred the parties to arbitration as simply permitting arbitrability under the lex fori.
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In short, it is a treaty obligation for a national court applying Article II of the New York Convention to recognize a valid arbitration agreement, unless the dispute is imperatively subject to the court's own 'international' jurisdiction. If it is the exclusive jurisdiction of a foreign court or authority which is involved, and the 32 See ICC Award 6097 ((1993) Arb. 686 at p. 691), die US Federal Court had considered tiiat 'die determination of whedier a type of claim is "not capable of settlement by arbitration" under Art. 11(1) must be made on an international scale, with reference to die laws of die countries party to die Convention'. However, and according to the same decision, reliance on such 'common' standards would become necessary only in me absence of 'subject matter exemptions to Art. 11(1)' specifically decreed by Congress, given diat 'Congress may specify categories of claims it wishes to reserve for the decision by our own courts without contravening diis Nation's obligations under the Convention'. '' For example, the Brussels Tribunal de Commerce, in Van Hopplynus v. Coherent, 5 October 1994 ((1997 22 Y B Comm. Arb. 637), had admitted the arbitrability of an exclusive distributorship agreement, apparendy applying the Californian law chosen by die parties under Article II, and notwidistanding the prohibition of arbitration by the famous Article 4 of the 1961 Belgian Law. One may read mis decision simply as denying that me 1961 law could be sufficient ground for providing die mandatory jurisdiction of Belgian courts in cross-border transactions.
lex fori recognizes such jurisdiction, the issue of Article II becomes hypothetical since the local court action must in all events be dismissed for lack of jurisdiction, regardless of any arbitration agreement.
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Does this imply that the local court should altogether disregard limits upon arbitrability prescribed under the law chosen by the parties (lex electionis) or the law of the seat of the arbitral tribunal (lex arbitrii) ?
IV. ARTICLE 11(3): ARBITRABILITY U N D E R T H E LEX ARBITRII OR T H E LEX ELECTIONIS?
Some commentators argue that non-arbitrability under a foreign legal system could render the arbitration clause 'null and void, inoperative or incapable of being performed' as provided in Article 11(3) of the Convention. They thus consider such nullity of the clause under the law chosen by the parties or the law of the place of arbitration to be a potential bar to enforcement of a future award under Article V(l)(a). Should the local court examine non-arbitrability under such foreign laws when applying Article 11(3), or prognosticate as to the possible nonenforceability of the ensuing award? Admitting protracted litigation over the hypothetical enforcement of a future award too easily 37 undermines the purpose of Article II of the Convention, which is to encourage recognition of arbitration clauses. As correctly emphasized by several court decisions, the forum's conception of arbitrability may be more liberal than that of foreign States, and it is up to the parties (for which, read claimant) to bear the risk of possible difficulties over the enforcement of the ensuing award in a foreign venue.
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Nevertheless, if the arbitration clause is duly proven to be null and void under both the foreign law chosen by the parties and the foreign law of the place of arbitration, the local court should avoid unnecessary harm to the parties, and simply assert jurisdiction and decide on the merits. However, as discussed earlier, one should be careful to distinguish between such nullity of the clause and nonarbitrability per se, which remains exclusively governed by the lex fori of the local court.
See, for example, Article 19 of the Brussels and Lugano Conventions: 'Where a court of a Contracting State is seized of a claim which is principally concerned with a matter over which the courts of another Contracting State have exclusive jurisdiction by virtue of Article 16, it shall declare of its own motion that it has no jurisdiction'. See, for example, the decision of the Court of First Instance of Lodi in Adda Officine Elettromeccaniche e Meccaniche et al. v. Alsthom Atlantique et al. ((1996) Foreign restrictions upon arbitrability, whether deriving from case law or statutory enactment, are often decisions of policy. As a result, any assessment of nonarbitrability under the foreign lex arbitrii for the purposes of Article 11(3) of the Convention may prove to be premature. Normally, both the arbitral tribunal and the court at the place of arbitration to which an application for the setting aside of the award is made would have full opportunity to examine the issue of arbitrability under the laws of the State concerned.
In our opinion, it is only in rare circumstances that non-arbitrability under the foreign lex arbitrii should be examined at the stage of mandatory referral to arbitration. A case in point would be when the petitioner before the court -the party resisting arbitration -meets the strict burden of proving that, for reasons of nonarbitrability at the place of arbitration, the arbitration clause is de facto incapable of being performed, as provided in Article II(3). 39 Should doubt persist, the court must decline jurisdiction and refer the parties to arbitration in the foreign venue.
(b) Lex Electionis?
As far as the choice of law by the parties is concerned, seldom do they identify a law as specifically applicable to the arbitration agreement (lex electionis). As Jan Paulsson remarks, if there is a system somewhere that recognizes the arbitrability of the parties' dispute, it must be assumed that the parties wanted that system to govern their agreement. 40 Even if it is admitted that the law chosen to govern the contract -lex contractus -should also govern the arbitration clause, 41 the fact remains that the issue of arbitrability under the law chosen by the parties falls first and foremost within the jurisdiction of the arbitral tribunal itself. Under the principle of Kompetenz-Kompetenz, which prevails in most legal systems, priority is given to the arbitral tribunal to decide on its own jurisdiction, including with respect to the validity of the arbitration agreement. 42 When the parties choose a law, they simply intend to seek adequate protection for their private agreement under that law. At the same time, prohibitions on arbitrability under the chosen law are not destined to safeguard the forum's fundamental conceptions of international jurisdiction, under which arbitrability is presumably permitted. Nonarbitrability under the lex electionis is therefore a matter relating primarily to the parties' private agreement, which the court should refer to arbitrators for assessment and determination unless, under the ordinary principles of contract law, it has manifestly and conclusively vitiated the parties' offer and acceptance to refer the dispute to arbitration.
V. ARBITRABILITY U N D E R ARTICLE V O F T H E C O N V E N T I O N (a) Article V(2)(a)
Construed as above, Articles V and II of the Convention should be consistent with each other with regard to arbitrability. Article V(2)(a) confirms mat, when asked to recognize and enforce a foreign arbitral award, arbitrability per se is to be decided ex officio and in accordance with the judge's lex fori. The controlling legislation is therefore mat of the forum, whether the judge is enforcing an arbitration agreement under Article II or an arbitration award under Article V. An award is not enforceable if the lex fori gives a local court or recognizes a foreign authority's sole jurisdiction over the subject matter, to the exclusion of arbitration.
(b) Does Article V(l)(a) Cover Arbitrability?
Under Article V(l)(a), it is up to the party resisting enforcement of an award to prove the nullity of the arbitration agreement. In our opinion, restrictions upon ((1996) 21 YB Comm. Arb. 181): after holding that a 'fraudin-the-inducement claim' is arbitrable under the FAA (no. 10) and that the parties' agreement 'neither unequivocally excludes fraud-in-the-inducement claims from its general arbitration provision nor unequivocally invokes Japanese arbitration law' (no. 15), the court referred the parties to arbitration of that claim in Tokyo under Japanese law, 'even assuming that under Japanese law' the claim would be held to be non-arbitrable. A foreign State cannot claim immunity from the jurisdiction of other States and invoke the exclusive jurisdiction of its own courts, since an agreement to arbitrate is itself a waiver of immunity. In the famous LIAMCO case of 18 January 1980 18 January ((1981 6 YB Comm Arb. 248 at p. 250), however, the District Court of Columbia refused to recognize an award issued in connection with the Libyan nationalization law on the basis of Article V(2)(a), holding, inter alia, that the Libyan law had 'vested exclusive determination of any compensation in a special committee provided for in the same law', which the District Court (albeit erroneously) felt compelled to respect pursuant to die American doctrine of Act of State. Section 2204 of the US FIA, as amended in 1988, specifically provides that the doctrine is no basis for refusing recognition to an arbitration award: see Craig, Park and Paulsson, supra n. 14, section 36-03.
arbitrability imposed by the law chosen by the parties or that of the place of arbitration are practically irrelevant under this provision. As a general rule, an award on jurisdiction rendered in violation of the rules on arbitrability in force at the place of arbitration is open to challenge before the courts of that country. The appropriate defence for a party wishing to resist enforcement is therefore Article V(l)(e) of the Convention, which allows for an award suspended or set aside in its country of origin not to be enforced. If the award has survived the challenge at the place of arbitration, then the foreign enforcement courts should simply dismiss the defence. If the resisting party has failed to appeal and challenge the award, enforcement courts may reasonably conclude that the petitioner has failed to prove that non-arbitrability at the seat of arbitration would be a cause of the nullity of the arbitration clause, all the more so if the forum's conception of arbitrability purportedly upholds the validity of such clause.
More moot is the attempt by a party to resist enforcement of an award by relying on non-arbitrability under the law chosen by the parties (lex electionis). When such a case arises, the arbitral tribunal must have certainly ruled on and rejected the party's objection. Since the dispute is presumably arbitrable under the enforcement court's lex fori (Article V(2)(a): see (a) above) and from the forum's point of view, restrictions upon arbitrability under the lex electionis are consequendy not essential to the public administration of justice, but only result from private agreement, the enforcement court should respect the arbitrators' ruling on their jurisdiction unless, pursuant to general principles of contract law, the parties' consent to refer their disputes to arbitration is fundamentally flawed.
(c) Non-arbitrability and Public Policy Distinguished
Several commentators have expressed the view that Article V(2)(a) is tautological since its purpose and scope are already covered by the general public policy defence under Article V(2)(b). 46 According to our understanding, however, nonarbitrability derives from the exclusive jurisdiction of a national court. As such, subparagraphs (a) and (b) of Article V(2) call for two different types of scrutiny. The first pertains to the jurisdiction of a State authority, and constitutes an absolute procedural bar to the recognition of an arbitral award, irrespective of its findings. The second pertains to the merits, and sets standards to be respected by arbitrators and their awards. 45 See supra section IV(b) and n. 43.
See Philippe Fouchard, 'La portee internationale de l'annulation d'une sentence dans son pays d'origine' (1997) Rev. de l'Arb., 347, in whose opinion, Article V(2)(a), already covered by letter (b), should be eliminated. See also Paulsson, supra n. 2 at p. 98; van den Berg, supra n. 6 at p. 368; Hanotiau, supra n. 6 at pp. 929-930; Herrmann, supra n. 5 at p. 220.
VI. C O N C L U S I O N
In our view, the New York Convention should be construed as follows:
• for the purposes of Article II, the subject matter of the dispute is capable of setdement by arbitration unless the court seized of an action on the merits determines that, under the laws of the forum, it has mandatory jurisdiction over the dispute, to the exclusion of arbitration; • for the purposes of Article V(l)(a), the non-arbitrability of the subject matter cannot constitute a defence to the enforcement of an award; • for the purposes of Article V(2)(a), recognition and enforcement of an award may be refused only if, under the laws of the forum, the subject matter of the dispute is expressly reserved to the mandatory jurisdiction of a national court or authority, to the exclusion of arbitration.
Some may consider the solution advocated in this article as too conservative; others may find it too liberal. To our mind, a less restrictive solution must first abolish the concept of arbitrability altogether, whilst a less liberal solution would place unnecessary barriers before the parties, who should have free access to a neutral and impartial tribunal of their choice. Finally, one serious concern over the exclusive application of the lex fori to the issue of arbitrability is the fear that it may enable the parties to resolve their dispute in disregard of legitimate foreign interests while enjoying legal protection in the forum State. 47 This concern, however, may be adequately addressed by courts called upon to scrutinize the merits of an award in the context of applications for an award to be set aside on the ground of public policy. Yet that is another subject with its own endless debates.
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Such legitimate concerns have been voiced, for example, in relation to the liberal policy on arbitrability adopted in Switzerland. SeeJ.-F. Poudret, 'Discrepancies between the New York Convention and Chapter 12 of the Swiss PIL', in The New York Convention of 1958 (ASA Special Series No. 9) at p. 243: 'One can thus wonder if it were really opportune to choose such a criterion and want, in a typically Swiss fashion, to be wise on our own ... at least temporarily as the German project retains the same criterion'; and Bucher, supra n. 14 at p. 41 (no. 100):'... la Suisse n'a pas interet a devenir une terre de refuge pour des arbitrages sans liens significatifs avec notre pays ...'. With regard to the controversy over the sources of the public policy objection, see Arfazadeh, supra n. 22, at pp. 251-253.
